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Fertility and Population Change in the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Wendy Sigle 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Like most wealthy countries, the UK population is ageing and is set to continue to age for 
the next several decades.  However recent and projected rates of change in the share of the 
elderly population are slow compared to most other EU-27 countries.  Although since 1998 
net migration has played some role, the UK's relatively benign demographic profile has 
much to do with its relatively high fertility rates. Population issues, low fertility in particular, 
are not considered to be a major policy concern or an appropriate target for government 
intervention.  A combination of moderately high fertility and high female employment has 
(at least historically) been achieved without implementing the kinds of work-family 
reconciliation policies that are credited with sustaining fertility elsewhere in Europe.  A  
Iaissez  faire approach to the economy and residual approach to welfare may well have 
sustained UK fertility levels by facilitating childbearing in more socio-economically 
disadvantaged families.  Recent, path deviant, work-family reconciliation policies have been 
adopted, but the wider institutional context has moderated their potential to reduce the 
costs of childbearing. 
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“Britain is insular, bound up by its trade, its markets….with the most varied and 
often the most distant countries…. She has, in all her work, very special, very 
original habits and traditions. In short, the nature,  structure, circumstances, 
peculiar to Britain are different from those of the other continentals… How can 
Britain, being what she is, come into our system?” 
-- Charles de Gaulle, Paris 1963 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1985 the UK had one of the oldest populations in Europe.  With 15 percent of its 
population aged 65 and older, it ranked second only to Sweden (with 17 percent) amongst 
the countries that now comprise the EU-27 (Office for National Statistics [ONS] 2012).  A 
baby boom in the 1960s was followed in the next decade by a substantial fall in the number 
of births. In 1976, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births for the first time in 
the 20th century.   Numbers of recorded births only started to recover in the early 1980s, in 
part because the 1960s baby boom cohorts were entering their reproductive years.  Over 
this same period, the total fertility rate (TFR) fell from nearly three to a low of 1.69 (in 1977), 
eventually stabilizing at around 1.8 in the early 1980s (Figure 1).  
 
Twenty-five years later, depending on how you look at it, the UK did not appear to be quite 
so old.  The UK population had continued to age, but the pace of change was slow 
compared to most of the rest of Europe. The percentage of the population aged 65 and 
older was, in 2010, slightly below the EU-27 average, and the UK looked relatively well 
placed to support a larger elderly population.  The UK's fall from the top to the middle of the 
European rankings has much to do with its relatively stable and moderately high fertility 
rates. Over the entire period from 1985 until 2010, the TFR averaged 1.75.    Between 1985 
and 1990 the TFR increased slightly from 1.79 to 1.83, after which it fell year on year 
reaching a low of 1.63 in 2001.  From that point, though, it rebounded rapidly, and in 2007, 
the TFR reached 1.87.  In subsequent years (at least until 20131), it has consistently exceeded 
1.9 (Figure 1).  Along with Sweden, France, and Ireland, the UK currently ranks as one of the 
highest fertility countries in the European Union.       
 
The UK has recorded positive net immigration from 1994 with marked increases after 2001 
and then again after 2004.  The new arrivals had a rapid impact on the size and age 
structure of the UK population2.  Because migration tends to select young, working age 
adults, net migration has had a moderating effect on population aging by  increasing the 
relative size of the population below age 65.   Moreover, many of the young migrants have 
gone on to have children after they arrived in the UK.  Births to non-UK born women 
account for around two-thirds of the increase in the number of births between 2001 and 
2007 (Tromans, Natamba and Jefferies 2009) and more than 69 percent of the increase 
between 2007 and 2011 (Zumpe, Dormon, and Jefferies 2012). The slightly higher period 
fertility of non-UK born women elevated the UK TFR by around 0.1 children in the period 
from 2004 to 2011 (Tromans et al 2009; Zumpe et al2012).  This means that trends in TFR 
since 2004 are largely due to increasing fertility among UK born women. 
 
                                                 
1
 According to provision estimates from the Office of National Statistics the provisional TFR for the 
United Kingdom in 2013 was 1.83. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/business-
transparency/freedom-of-information/what-can-i-request/published-ad-hoc-data/pop/september-
2014/index.html  
2
 Between 2001 and 2006, the share of the foreign born population increased from 8 to 10 percent;  
the increment from 6 to 8 percent took place over two decades (Dunnell 2007).   
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While recent demographic trends have reduced the pace of population aging and its 
potentially negative impact on the British economy and society, they have also brought 
fairly rapid, and not entirely anticipated, population growth. According to the 2011 census, 
the UK population was 500,000 higher than suggested in the 2010 population projections 
(ONS 2013).  The 7 percent increase in the total population recorded in the 2011 census was 
the largest decennial growth in the UK population since 1961. Put another way, about half 
of the population growth since 1964 took place in the last decade.   
 
Projections indicate that, by 2035, the old age dependency ratio in the UK will increase to 
37.9 (EC 2012, pg 299, Tables A.11 and A.12).3 While an increase in the elderly population to 
23 percent (EC 2012, pg 299, Table A.12) is not insubstantial, it represents a modest pace of 
change relative to what has been projected for many other EU countries. By 2035 only 4 of 
the EU-27 countries are projected to have a smaller share of older people in their 
populations (ONS 2012). If recent projections are accurate, the UK could have, in the course 
of 50 years, gone from being one of the oldest to one of the youngest European countries.   
Whether this demographic future materializes depends, of course, on whether the 
projections are based on an accurate depiction of future trends.  As the largest component 
of population change, the accuracy of fertility assumptions is particularly important. The 
2010-based projections assume that completed family size will fall gradually from 1.98 for 
women born in 1960 and stabilize at around 1.84 for cohorts born from 2005 onwards.4 Is 
this realistic or likely?  As Hobcraft (1996) notes, “the grossest errors [in national population 
projections and forecasts] have resulted from failures (or perhaps just inability?) to 
anticipate turning points in fertility trends (487).  Even if we put these “grossest errors” to 
one side, with few exceptions, long-term fertility assumptions have tended to exceed actual 
fertility rates (Shaw 2007).    The 1985-based population projections assumed that the TFR 
would climb steadily over the next 15 years and stabilize in 2002-3 at around 2.01. Although 
these projections were the first to assume long-term fertility at below replacement level, 
the assumption overestimated actual fertility rates even during recent years when rates 
were at their highest.   It is therefore pertinent to seek to explain and understand the past 
trends. 
 
From a cross-national policy perspective, the UK provides a potentially instructive case 
study.   Population issues, low fertility in particular, are not considered to be a major policy 
concern or an appropriate target for government intervention.  With its liberal market 
economy and residual5 approach to welfare, a combination of high female employment and 
relatively high fertility has been achieved without a coherent or generous set of work-family 
reconciliation policies . For those who want to argue that the "highest-low" fertility achieved 
in countries like France and Sweden can be attributed to their generous work-family 
reconciliation policies, similarly high fertility (almost always based on the TFR) in the UK, 
and indeed in the rest of the Anglosphere, must be explained (Sigle-Rushton 2009; 2014).   
With that goal in mind, the following section provides a brief and overview of political and 
institutional developments which have conditioned the framing and response to population 
issues and fertility.  I then discuss how UK fertility rates have been sustained at moderately 
high levels following the fertility declines of the 1970s.  I first consider the two decades from 
1981 to 2000 – a period dominated by (center-right) Conservative governments -- and then 
focus on explanations for the increased fertility that was observed in more recent years.  
 
                                                 
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-
2_en.pdf (pg 299). 
4
 The more recent 2012 projections assume slightly lower short-term rates and which stabilize at 1.89. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_334975.pdf  
5
 In contrast to  “institutional” models which tend to provide universal welfare benefits and services, 
the approach of the residual welfare state is more targeted and means tested. 
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British Population Policy 
 
Although data limitations mean it is impossible to document precisely, it is clear that British 
fertility began to fall in the 1870s and reached extremely low levels in the 1930s.  This was a 
rare historical moment.  It is worth mentioning, I think, because it is one of the few times 
that the issue of low fertility attracted the attention of British policymakers (Hobcraft 1996).  
Their response was cautious and restrained, but it left an important intellectual legacy. The 
1938 Population (Statistics) Act established a valuable information base, and the Royal 
Commission on Population was established in 1944 to provide expert advice.  These 
developments, along with the founding of the Population Investigation Committee6 in 1936, 
established demography as scientific and academic discipline in a political context that for 
most of the 20th century, appeared ambivalent, if not entirely unconcerned, about  the issue 
of population growth  (Simons 1973).   
 
Population issues next entered the political arena in the early 1970s, this time in response to 
the rapid population growth of the 1960s.  A 1973 report by the Government appointed 
Population Panel concluded that Britain would do better in future with a stationary rather 
than an increasing population (Population Panel, 1973, p. 6).   The report stopped short of 
recommending a comprehensive and coherent population policy, although its authors 
advocated for a program of family planning services to be provided through the National 
Health Service (NHS) so that unwanted births could be averted.  The 1974 NHS 
Reorganization Act incorporated this recommendation, and from 1 April of that year, family 
planning advice and supplies were provided free of charge and irrespective of age or marital 
status.  This was the last of a series of reforms extending back to 1967 that liberalized access 
to family planning information and services and included, from 1968, access to abortion7.    
A number of authors have suggested that a substantial share of the fertility decline that 
occurred in the early 1970s  can be attributed to the these legislative changes, which 
increased access to and use of the contraceptive pill and reduced mistimed or unwanted 
pregnancies (Murphy 1993; Hobcraft 1996).     Pre-marital conceptions, which had increased 
throughout the 1960s, fell back to 1950s levels by the late 1970s, particularly for women 
under the age of 20.   To the extent that women were averting mistimed rather than 
unwanted births, some of the period decline recorded in these years would be a tempo 
effect.  This is perhaps why the Population Panel felt confident enough to suggest that 
completed family size would not fall below replacement "in the foreseeable future",  in the 
same year that the TFR fell below that threshold (Figure 1).   
 
The persistently low fertility rates of the 1970s did not elicit much political debate or 
response.  In the decades the followed, the UK Government remained reluctant to intervene 
directly to influence fertility, save efforts since the 1990s to reduce rates of teenaged 
motherhood (Department for Education and Skills 2006).  The official UK policy, first 
presented at the 1984  UN Conference on Population Mexico, and reiterated at the 1994 UN 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, has been to adapt to low fertility 
rather than attempt to alter it: 
 
The United Kingdom government does not pursue a population policy in the sense 
of actively trying to influence the overall size of the population, its age-structure, or 
the components of change except in the field of immigration. Nor has it expressed a 
                                                 
6
 The Population Investigation Committee established the journal Population Studies in 1947. 
7
 For the first five years, however, abortion services were limited and rates of use were low 
(Department of Health 2007). 
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view about the size of population, or the age-structure, that would be desirable . 
…The current level of births has not been the cause of general anxiety. The 
prevailing view is that decisions about fertility and childbearing are for people 
themselves to make, but that it is proper for government to provide individuals with 
the information and the means necessary to make their decisions effective. To this 
end, the government provides assistance with family planning as part of the 
National Health Service. The ‘ageing’ of the population does raise social and 
economic issues. However, it is believed that these will prove manageable; and also, 
to a degree, that society will adapt….’ (Office for National Statistics 1993). 
 
As migration rates increased in recent years, accelerated rates of population growth again 
became a topic of political debate.  But politicians have attempted to treat migration and 
population growth as distinct issues.  Speaking to the House Liaison Committee in 2006,   
then Prime Minister Tony Blair reaffirmed that the UK had a migration policy but no policy 
on population growth.8    The current prime minister, David Cameron, has been more willing 
to frame immigration as an issue of 'unsustainable' population growth (Cameron 2007; see 
also Conservative Manifesto 2010).  But as far as fertility is concerned, the Cameron 
administration has maintained the long-running non-interventionist stance.  Policymakers 
from both main political parties have shown little enthusiasm for policies that would seek to 
influence fertility levels or birth rates.  To understand how UK policies and institutions have 
supported moderately high levels in the UK over the past thirty-five years requires an 
exploration of indirect effects and inadvertent consequences. 
 
 1981 to 2000: Relative stability 
 
When examined in isolation, UK fertility in the last two decades of the 20th century might be 
described as a period of stability followed by a period of substantial decline.  Between 1981 
and 1990, the TFR fluctuated between 1.77 and 1.83, and then fell steadily to a level of 1.64 
at the end of the period (Figure 1).  However, compared to the trends of the previous two 
decades, and situated in the context of Europe where nearly all countries reached record 
lows and some with TFRs below 1.5 (Kohler et al 2006), the picture that emerges is one of 
relative stability.    The TFR remained below 1.7 for only a few years at the turn of the 
century, and by 2002, the UK TFR had more or less recovered, climbing from the middle to 
the high end of the EU rankings. 
 
Efforts to explain why some European countries have sustained moderately high fertility 
have tended to look to the Scandinavian countries and France and focus on policy changes 
which encouraged (or responded to demands for) modifications to the male breadwinner 
model.  In the formative years of welfare state development, virtually all capitalist 
economies negotiated the demand for social reproduction9 (which would divert resources 
from capital accumulation) and secured its provision by providing some form of institutional 
support for heterosexual marriage and a male breadwinner/female carer arrangement.  
Although, the housewife ideal was often unattainable in many poorer families and women 
have always engaged in economic activities to support their families, the assumption that 
the wife (ideally) would be economically dependent on her husband guided the early 
development of all modern welfare states (Lewis 1992).  As women increasingly wanted to 
enter and remain in the labor market, they confronted institutions that were incompatible 
with the responsibilities of social reproduction.  When women had the means (with 
                                                 
8
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmliaisn/709/6070407.htm  
9
 Social reproduction is a concept used by feminist scholars who study gender divisions of labor.  
Laslett and Brenner (1989) describe it as  “…the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, 
responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis, and 
intergenerationally (382).” 
6 | P a g e  
 
unprecedented access to contraception) and the incentive to postpone (or even forego) 
childbearing, fertility declined.  Whether or not the underlying motivation was a 
demographic one, those countries that found new ways of supporting social reproduction 
and, in particular, those that made work and motherhood more compatible, were often 
countries that averted rapid and deep fertility decline.   
 
This logically coherent and compelling argument, however, fails to account for trends 
observed in the UK (and the rest of the moderately high fertility countries of the 
Anglosphere).    While the Scandinavian countries were developing and promoting policies 
that would provide new sources of social reproduction through the development of 
publically subsidized (child) care services or by encouraging a (modest) renegotiation of 
gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work, the UK remained implacable in its opposition 
to these kinds of policy interventions.   At least until 1997, a strong liberal welfare tradition 
giving primacy to the market set the UK apart from much of the rest of Europe.  Successive 
Conservative governments actively opposed the development of work-family reconciliation 
policies at both the national- and EU-level. Between 1979 and 1992, almost all EU social 
policy regulations, save those related to the “working environment”, were governed by 
unanimous consent (Hoskyns 1996; Duncan 2002).  Although observers have noted that a 
predictable UK veto allowed politicians from other countries to pay lip service to policies 
that they would otherwise not support and provided a politically expedient excuse for 
restraint (Lange 1992),   UK opposition effectively stymied efforts to take forward a social 
policy agenda.  The UK consistently blocked efforts to develop binding child care and 
parental leave regulations (Duncan 2002). The Pregnant Workers Directive, which entitled 
working mothers to 14 weeks of maternity leave, was finally put forward as a health and 
safety measure to obviate the need for British (and Italian) consent.   In 1992, the 
Agreement on Social Policy10, opened up a wider range of EU social policies to qualified 
majority voting11.  This protocol, and a UK opt-out until 199712, made it possible for the 
remaining 11 EU member states to overcome the deadlock of previous decades.  Parental 
leave legislation, first put forward (and vetoed by the UK) in 1983 , was finally passed in 
1996  (Fusulier 2011).    
 
The transposition of the Pregnant Workers Directive had a limited impact on UK policy in 
the 1990s, in part because of successful efforts by the UK (Thatcher) government to 
neutralize its content.   Compliance with the EU Directive meant that the strict eligibility 
conditions13  in previous legislation were relaxed (McRae 1991).  Even so, throughout this 
period, statutory maternity benefits remained limited in terms of generosity and duration14.   
Some employers offered extended leave or more generous compensation, but this was 
mostly confined to the public sector  (O’Connor et al., 1999).  Similarly, when the UK finally 
introduced a parental leave policy 15,   it only complied with the minimum requirements set 
out in the EU Directive (an unpaid individual entitlement of 13 weeks for each parent).   
                                                 
10
 Attached as a protocol of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union.     
11
 Under qualified majority voting, each member state is allotted a number of votes based on their 
size and population. For more information, see http://www.euro-
know.org/europages/dictionary/q.html 
12
 The opt-out meant that the UK was exempt from legislation arising from this protocol. 
13
 To qualify for maternity benefits, women had to have worked continuously and for the same 
employer at least 16 hours per week for two years or 8 hours per week for five years.  Only about half 
of all working mothers met these eligibility criteria. 
14
 Women who met more stringent eligibility requirements relating to their work history (see previous 
footnote) and National Insurance contributions were entitled to a longer period of leave (initially 28 
weeks) than the minimum of 14 weeks required by the PWD.     
15
 When the its opt-out (described in footnote 12)  from the Agreement on Social Policy ended in 
1997,  the UK was required to give force the Parental Leave Directive. 
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Throughout most of this period, its system of support for families with children remained 
largely unaltered.  A system of universal family allowances, first introduced in 1946, which 
provided a universal, flat-rate cash transfer to families with children, was slightly amended 
in 1991 to provide a higher benefit for the first child.  For most of the period, state 
involvement in the provision of child care was restricted to a discretionary role for local 
authorities in the provision of pre-school education (Butler, Lugton and Rutter 2014). 
However there were some minor developments in the 1990s including tax reliefs for 
employer provided daycare in 1990. The Nursery Education and Grant Maintained Schools 
Act 1996 laid the groundwork for the expansion of early education in later years, but it was 
only in 1998 that a newly elected Labour government published  Meeting the Childcare 
Challenge (Department for Education and Employment, 1998), a consultation document 
which set out a framework for a national childcare strategy16.    
 
As numerous scholars have noted, the 1980s and 1990s was a period when families were left 
to (some would say “trusted to”) make their own arrangements for the care of children 
(OECD 2005), and, given prevailing gender norms, the default option was maternal care.  
Mothers could enter the labor market if they could figure out how to manage their care 
responsibilities.  Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that, for many years, the 
United Kingdom was unique (along with the Netherlands) in Europe for providing low levels 
of income support to poor lone mothers so that they could remain at home and care for 
their children full-time (Millar 1996).  From the early 1970s, a means-tested and work-
related benefit was introduced, in part, to address poverty in single parent households.  
From 1994, Family Credit17 claimants could, before the means test was applied, deduct 
childcare costs of up to £40 a week18 from their income.   The disregard was intended to 
encourage mothers’ employment, but few families in receipt of Family Credit made use of it 
(Dilnot and Duncan 1992). 
 
To understand how fertility might have been sustained throughout this period, it is 
important to consider the wider institutional context.  Here there is much that distinguishes 
the UK from its European partners.  The Varieties of Capitalism literature19 has described 
the UK as conforming more closely to the Liberal Market Economy (LME) than to the Co-
ordinated Market Economy (CME) that is more typical throughout Europe (Hall and Soskice 
2001). Compared to more co-ordinated economies, labor markets in LMEs are more 
competitive, unregulated, and fluid.  With low levels of regulation, LMEs encourage the 
development of general, transferrable skills and high rates of turnover, but within a highly 
segmented labor market.  Those who can compete at the top end of the occupational 
hierarchy can expect great rewards which grow over time, but those who are less 
competitive participate in a secondary market with few protections and low wages.   
Amongst the most highly skilled workforce, the competitive work environment can foster a 
culture of long working hours. Lower skilled workers enjoy few job protections and firm-
specific investments tend to be limited.  With few opportunities for progression, their wage 
                                                 
16
 The document set out a proposal that would ensure all four year olds had access to early education 
by Sept 1998 and presents a funding plan of £435 million over 5 years for the development of 
childcare services:  £310 million in start-up funds for out-of-school childcare facilities and a £6 million 
investment in the development of childcare places for younger children in England. 
17
 A means tested benefit for families with an adult working at least 24 (later reduced to 16) hours per 
week and at least one dependent child.  Originally called the Family Income Supplement (FIS) it was 
renamed Family Credit in 1988 and replaced by the Working Families Tax Credit in 1999 (discussed in 
more detail below). 
18
 The disregard was increased to £60 per week in the 1995 budget. 
19
 A number of authors have criticised this simplistic dichotomy, but for the purposes of the discussion 
that follows, this stylised framework has some heuristic value. 
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trajectories tend to flat. A marked reluctance to adopt measures that would interfere with 
labor markets or raise the costs of doing business implies a residual or “liberal" (Esping-
Andersen 1990) welfare regime with targeted and minimal social safety nets.   When 
(largely unrestrained) market forces push low wages near minimum living standards, 
incentives to participate can erode, however.  In the context of traditional gender 
arrangements and low levels of labor market regulation, the expansion of part-time work 
opportunities for women and at the low end of wage distribution, could be used by 
employers to resist upward pressure on wages (Hurstfied 1978).  In more co-ordinated 
economies, strong labor market regulations and a more powerful union presence can 
restrain these efforts (although sometimes this might mean excluding women/mothers 
from the labor market altogether).   
 
In earlier work, I have argued that these distinctive aspects of the Liberal Market Economy 
facilitated the early and moderately high fertility observed in more socio-economically 
disadvantaged groups in the UK and the rest of the Anglosphere (Sigle-Rushton 2008; 
2009).  In the absence of adequate child care support, most mothers would have to 
withdraw from employment, at least temporarily, when they had a child.  If they wanted to 
return to work, many would struggle to work full-time. Although there were part-time job 
opportunities, these tended to be concentrated where they had always been: at the lower 
end of the occupational hierarchy and wage distribution, which, prior to April 1999, had no 
floor in the form of a national minimum wage.  As a consequence, for women on moderate 
to high incomes, the transition to parenthood could carry substantial costs, particularly over 
the longer-term.  A withdrawal from the high end of the labor market and a return to a part-
time position would likely require a substantial occupational downgrade which could be 
difficult to reverse (Connolly and Gregory 2008; Dex and Bukodi 2012).   Faced with the 
prospect of long-term effects on their occupational attainment and life-time earnings, 
those women with the most to lose had a strongest incentive to postpone the transition to 
parenthood.  From the mid-1990s, rapid increases in house prices (Figure 2) may well have 
reinforced incentives to postpone amongst middle- and higher earner couples. For first time 
buyers, the ratio of gross earnings to house prices climbed from 2.1 in the fourth quarter of 
1995 to around 5 at the beginning of 2007.  In London, the ratio climbed from just under 3 to 
over 7 (Figure 3).  As families increasingly required two incomes, first to secure a mortgage 
and then to meet the payments, childbearing, and the income loss associated with it, might 
be unaffordable. 
 
In contrast, lower skilled, more disadvantaged women were already at the bottom of the 
wage distribution, and so a period of inactivity followed by adjustments to their working 
hours would have little impact on their current and future wages.  Incentives to postpone 
childbearing, even to qualify for maternity benefits, were weak:  the existence of low-level 
means tested benefits offered a viable alternative. Over the longer-term their wages were 
unlikely to grow steeply even if they had remained continuously employed.  Rising house 
prices meant that home ownership was increasingly out of reach for those on low incomes.  
However the allocation of the increasingly limited number of public housing units20 
prioritized families with children (Lupton et al 2009). Those who were married to or 
cohabiting with men at the bottom of the wage distribution could rely on means-tested 
financial support as insurance against family instability and the loss of their partners’ 
income.     
 
                                                 
20
 The “right to buy” programme provided social tenants with the opportunity to buy their housing at 
reduced prices and so provided some opportunity for home ownership.  The policy reduced the stock 
of social housing and as a consequence, only those families most in need gained access to it (Lupton 
et al 2009).   
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In the UK policy setting, we might therefore expect to see a socially polarized fertility profile 
with more postponement, smaller families, and higher levels of childlessness amongst the 
most qualified and highest skilled, and earlier and larger families amongst those with lower 
qualifications and skills.   Empirical evidence relevant to this period is largely consistent with 
these predicted labor market and demographic patterns. In an analysis using data collected 
from a number of European countries between 1999 and 2001,  Jane Waldfogel and I found 
that compared to other countries, the UK “motherhood gap” (the gap in earnings between 
mothers and childless women), is high and does not narrow appreciably as children get 
older (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007).  High period and cohort total fertility rates have 
been achieved with a relatively high variation in completed family size and a relatively high 
incidence of childlessness (Coleman 1996;  Shkolnikov, Andreev, Houle and Vaupel 2007), 
particularly amongst the highly educated (Kneale and Joshi  2008; Berrington, Stone, and 
Beaujouan 2014).The persistence of early childbearing is reflected in a ‘hump’ at young ages 
in the first birth fertility schedule, which is typical to the countries of the Anglosphere, and 
suggests a bifurcated fertility regime (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 2002).   Similar to 
what Ellwood and Jencks (2004) found in their analysis of US data, lower educated women 
appear to have continued to have children at (the same) younger ages,  while those who 
obtained high levels of education started to delay their first birth (Berrington et al 2014).   
Conditional on having had a first birth, the transition to the second was more rapid for the 
highly educated (Rendall and Smallwood 2003).  Nonetheless, the completed family size of 
highly educated women, particularly those in the more highly competitive managerial 
positions (Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002), was low relative to other women (Berrington et al 2014).    
 
Cross-national comparisons suggest that the moderately high fertility in the UK during this 
period was more socio-economically polarized than in  France and the Nordic countries 
(Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002; Rendall et al 2005).  Importantly, the costs of sustaining moderately 
high fertility may have fallen disproportionately on those groups with the lowest levels of 
resources, exacerbating income inequality and contributing to the high child poverty rates 
observed in the UK (Sigle-Rushton 2008). 
 
The period since 2001 
 
A change of government in 1997 marked the beginning of a period of rapid and extensive 
policy change in the UK.  A new anti-poverty program was implemented with a focus on 
employment as the best route out of poverty.   New policies targeted worklessness and the 
earnings of low paid workers.  High rates of child poverty were a key priority, with ambitious 
targets to halve (by 2010) and then eradicate it (by 2020).  In the context of these reforms, 
child care issues were successfully reframed as an obstacle to labor market participation, 
and  work-family reconciliation policies became a new feature of the  British welfare state 
(Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004; O’Connor et al., 1999).  
 
To what extent did these changes modify the fertility regime of previous decades? Work-
family reconciliation policies have been credited with sustaining fertility in other moderately 
high fertility settings, by making it easier for women to combine paid work and child 
rearing. In earlier decades, the strongest incentives to postpone childbearing were 
experienced by women who had the most to lose from an occupational downgrade.   If a 
new set of policies redressed these difficulties, there might be less social polarization in the 
UK fertility profile and possibly even higher fertility, as long as the new policy approach 
continued to support childbearing at the lower end of the income distribution as well.   
 
In 2001, a few years into the new policy program, fertility in the UK started to rise.  Although 
fertility rates increased for all women over 20, data (from England and Wales, Figure 4) 
show some of the most prominent changes involved women in their thirties and forties.   In 
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2004, the fertility rate at age 30–34 surpassed the fertility rate at age 25–29 for the first 
time.  Since then it has remained the most fertile age group.  Between 2001 and 2011, 
fertility rates for the age groups 35 and older showed the steepest increases, and in 2012, 
the average age at first birth was over 30 for the first time. Put alongside evidence (also 
from England and Wales) which suggests that almost all of the initial increase in the TFR 
(through 2006) can be attributed to first and second order births (Jefferies 2008), and it 
appears that recent trends involve women who, in the 1980s and 1990s, postponed the 
transition to motherhood.  
 
 It is not clear whether the new policy approach was responsible for these trends. A general 
upturn in period fertility has been observed across a wide range of countries over the same 
period (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009).  The TFR in other moderately high 
fertility European countries (Sweden in particular) behaved similarly. This suggests that, in 
the absence of any policy change, UK fertility may have increased anyway.  At issue is 
whether the new policies are capable of delivering the level of work-family reconciliation 
needed to alter incentives and so alter behavior.   A closer assessment of recent 
developments gives some reason to interpret the association with caution. 
 
The introduction  and expansion of a new set of family friendly policies marked a significant 
ideological change in UK politics.   The care of children was no longer seen as “private” 
matter, but an issue that required government support and involvement.  At the same time, 
the UK government was anxious to avoid interfering in the operation of labor market or to 
address inequality by targeting the high end of the earnings distribution (Sigle-Rushton 
2008).21  These concerns shaped the way the new policies were designed and implemented.  
The tendency has been to accommodate rather than transform the segmented and 
gendered labor market.   The approach to child care policy, for example, appears to be 
premised on the same expectations that shaped the fertility profile in previous decades: 
that mothers are secondary workers and should be solely responsible for care.  The duration 
and generosity of child care leave was significantly extended over this period, the focus has 
been almost exclusively on maternity leave.22  The rights for fathers to take child care leave 
have remained far more limited23.    The regulated mixed market approach to child care 
                                                 
21
 In a 2004 television interview, Prime Minister Tony Blair was asked whether he thought “an 
individual could earn too much money”.  His response provides a good summary of his Government’s 
view on inequality: 
….Do you mean that we should cap someone's income? Not really, no.  
Why? What is the point? You can spend ages trying to stop the highest  
paid earners earning the money but in an international market like  
today, you probably would drive them abroad. What does that matter?  
Surely the important thing is to level up those people that don't have  
opportunity in our society. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/newsnight/1372220.stm, 
accessed 20 September 2014.  
22
 By 2007 all mothers were entitled to 52 weeks of leave (although the right to return to the same job 
was only extended to the first 26 weeks).  While there has been little change in the likelihood that a 
mother returns to work within 18 months of birth (in fact the figure declined slightly between 2002 
and 2007), in recent years mothers have been more likely to return to the same employer (Stewart 
2013). What is less clear is whether those women returned to the same job and whether they 
experienced any occupational downgrading subsequent to their return, particularly if they wanted to 
reduce their working hours.   
23
 Since 2003, fathers have been entitled to two weeks Ordinary Paternity Leave (as it is now called) 
which is compensated at a flat rate. Throughout the period, parental leave, which included unpaid 
individual entitlements for men, remained minimal (Lewis and Campbell 2007).  From April 2011, 
qualifying mothers could choose to return to work and transfer up to 26 weeks of their leave 
entitlement (which is compensated at the same flat rate as additional maternity leave and ordinary 
paternity leave: £128.15 per week when it was first introduced) to their (qualifying) partner.   
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services has been criticized for doing more to address access than affordability (Butler, 
Lugton and Rutter 2014). While all three and four-year olds24 have a guaranteed place in 
early education, the entitlement is part-time covering only 15 hours per week (12.5 hours 
per week for 33 weeks per year until 2010) .  For many working parents, the early education 
offer is the only form of child care assistance they receive (Butler, Lugton and Rutter 2014). 
The gap between this entitlement and the hours of child care a working parent requires can 
be difficult to negotiate logistically and financially25. It is a policy that appears to facilitate 
short hours part-time employment and so does little to challenge the segmented labor 
market of previous decades. 
 
The nature and quality of part-time work and its impact on mothers has attracted a good 
deal of attention and research, but only a modest policy response.  Since April 2003, parents 
0f young children have had the “Right to Request” more flexible working conditions, 
including shorter hours.26  Employers can refuse the request for a number of business 
reasons and opportunities for legal redress are limited.  Although the majority of requests 
are approved27  evidence suggests that the long  hours culture – something UK policymakers 
remain unwilling to regulate -- still impacts negatively on mothers.  Data from the period 
before and after the right to request was implemented showed that most mothers still 
changed their employer when they changed their hours (Smeaton and Marsh 2006).   A 
recent review of the impact of the policy concluded:  “….as far as one of the objectives of 
the Right to Request has been to increase the ability of working mothers to continue at the 
same level of responsibility, and with the same employer, albeit at reduced hours, the 
impact of the Right to Request does not appear to have been substantial” (Hegewisch, 
2009: 22).     
 
Although most policy indicators show a substantial improvement in family policy over this 
period, their potential to change previous fertility patterns has likely been moderated by the 
political and institutional legacies of previous decades.  It is difficult to imagine that these 
policy changes would have anything more than a marginal effect on highly qualified and 
high earning women.  Those in their 30s who had previously postponed childbearing and 
whose incomes allowed them access to sufficient and high quality child care might find it 
easier to negotiate short leaves and to return to the same pre-parenthood working 
conditions, adopting what Fraser (1997) describes as the universal breadwinner model.  
Those who wanted to adapt their working conditions during the first years of parenthood 
would have the right to request flexible work, but in a culture of long working hours such 
requests may be refused  or difficult to achieve in practice (Lyonette et al 2010).  What is 
half-time work when all of your colleagues work well in excess of a typical working week?  
The most simple explanation for recent trends in first births amongst older women is a 
biological one. As they approached the end of their reproductive years, the question was no 
                                                                                                                                            
Although the measure provided some opportunity for men to take leave, it clearly reflected and 
continued to reinforce gendered divisions of labor. From 2015, fathers can take up to 50 weeks of the 
leave. Although it has been renamed “shared leave”, mothers still must trigger men’s entitlement by 
returning to work. 
24
 In 2013, the entitlement was extended to 2 year olds in low income families. 
25
 Estimates from 2008 suggest that the cost of childcare represented an effective tax of around 41 
per cent on the income of a second earner in an average-wage family (OECD 2011).    
26
 Originally, the right to request was available to parents of children under the age of 6 (18 if the child 
was disabled) and in 2009 to parents of non-disabled children aged 16 and younger.   The right to 
request was extended in 2007 to include employees with caring responsibilities for sick or disabled 
adult household members, and, in 2014, to all workers. 
27
 Survey data referring to the period from 2009 and 2011 indicate that, of those who were not still 
awaiting the outcome, about 14 per cent reported that their request was declined, and around 20 per 
cent reported that their request was accepted only after “negotiation/compromise/appeal”.    
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longer when, but whether, to have a first birth.   Data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) collected during the 1990s shows that most childless women – the most 
highly qualified in particular -- still wanted and intended to have children (Tavares 2010, 
Table 6; see also Kneale and Joshi 2008, Table 4).  Younger women with high levels of 
education and skills would still have strong labor market related incentives to postpone the 
transition to parenthood, reinforced, in this period,  by continued house price increases and 
the introduction and rapid increase of tuition fees28 for higher education which meant that 
many students entered the labor market with substantial debts.   
 
Another potentially important set of policies aimed to reduce child poverty and the number 
of workless households.  Reforms of the income tax system and increases in both means-
tested (Income Support) and universal child benefits supplemented the incomes of the 
poorest families by as much as 10 percent.  The Working Families Tax Credit, a refundable 
tax credit for low income working families, was one of the largest and most significant of 
these policy initiatives.  As the benefit was calculated at the household level, there were 
concerns that it might encourage and reinforce a male breadwinner arrangement in two 
parent households (Brewer and Shephard 2004).  Evidence suggests those concerns may 
have been well founded.  A number of analyses of the impact of the policy found a 
significant increase in the employment activity of lone mothers, but little overall effect on 
the employment activity of women in couples (Brewer, Ratcliffe and Smith, 2012).  Brewer 
and colleagues (2012) argue that the same income taper which created disincentives for 
second earning could also have reduced the opportunity costs of childbearing.   To the 
extent that the low educated already faced weak incentives to postpone childbearing and 
had low rates of childlessness (Rendall and Smallwood 2003), it is unlikely that changes in 
their fertility behavior contributed much to recent trends which, as discussed above, were 
largely driven by late and low order births (Jefferies 2008).  However, these policies take on 
more relevance when viewed through a transnational lens. 
 
When the EU enlarged in 2004, most member states put in place transition measures to 
temporarily restrict in-migration of workers from the A8 member countries.29  Only the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden, provided immediate and open access to their labor markets.  As a 
consequence, annual net migration which had been increasing since the early 1990s, 
accelerated substantially30. Although recent migrants were coming from countries with low 
fertility and many were migrating for economic reasons, their period fertility nonetheless 
exceeded that of the UK born population and of their country of origin (Dorman 2014) .  It is 
not immediately clear why migrants from the A8 countries have higher fertility than women 
who living in their countries of origin.  It could be that women who intend to migrate 
postpone childbearing until after they move (Toulemon 2004), and so their higher period 
fertility represents a tempo effect.  It is also possible that migrants consider not just wage 
differentials but also the opportunities that the economic and social setting provides for the 
organization of family life when they make decisions about where to locate and eventually 
settle.  In this regard, membership of the EU community can reduce information costs as 
well as the costs of movement.  A qualitative study that compared the subsequent 
childbearing intentions of Polish born parents in London and Krakow found that parents in 
                                                 
28
 From £1000 per annum in 1998 to £9000 per annum at most of universities in England and Wales 
since 2012. 
29
 The A8 countries are the 8 low income (per capita incomes of about 40 per cent of the EU average), 
Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) that, along with Malta and Cyprus, joined the EU in 2004. 
30
 There was a net migration of 180,000 A8 citizens to the UK between 2004 and 2006, accounting for 
13 percent of the total long-term immigration.  Amongst the A8 countries, the largest number of 
immigrants came from Poland, and by 2010 they formed the largest group of non-UK nationals (ONS 
2011). 
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Krakow often cited the costs of children as an important constraint, and often compared 
the Polish context to other, more favorable, policy settings as they justified their intentions. 
Amongst the migrants living in London, parents who had previously worked in high status 
jobs in Poland said they were willing to accept an occupational downgrade in order to raise 
their families in the UK.  They cited better state support for children and greater 
opportunities for mothers to spend time with children (through part-time work or 
temporary periods of withdrawal) as reasons both to remain in the UK and to have 
additional children (Marczak 2012).  While it is not likely that policy changes brought in to 
address child poverty since 2001 had much impact on the fertility rates of low educated UK- 
born women, they may have contributed to higher fertility by making the UK a more 
attractive place for some international migrants whose family preferences were closely 
aligned with the (uniquely) gendered incentive structures of those new anti-poverty policies 
and which were not well supported by the family policy packages offered in their countries 
of origin.   
 
The financial crisis of 2007 and the first years of coalition government of 2010 brought in a 
number of austerity measures.   Previous developments in work-family reconciliation 
policies were not reversed, and instead, the generosity of the welfare and benefit system 
was targeted.  While the previous government had made work pay by improving its 
conditions and rewards, for a male breadwinner at least, the current approach is to 
substantially reduce decommodification31 in the benefits system.   Previous experiences 
suggest that such measures will probably do more to reverse gains in child poverty than 
substantially reduce fertility, at least among UK-born women.   The changes might, 
however, impact fertility by shaping the decisions either to migrate or to remain and build 
families in the UK.   This is an important area for future research. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Like most wealthy countries, the UK population is ageing and will continue to age for the 
next several decades.  However recent and projected rates of change in the share of the 
elderly population are slow relative to much of the rest of the EU-27 countries (ONS 2012).  
Although since 1998 net migration has played some role, the UK's relatively benign 
demographic profile has much to do with its relatively high fertility rates (ONS 2014; 
Coleman 2007).   From a European policy perspective, its “highest-low" fertility is difficult to 
explain (Sigle-Rushton 2009).   Moderately high fertility rates were sustained – at least 
historically – without the work-family reconciliation policies characteristic of other 
moderately high fertility countries.  In earlier work, I have argued that the UK’s unique 
institutional setting created incentives for a moderately high but socially polarized fertility 
profile (Sigle-Rushton 2008; 2009).  In this paper, I build on previous work and consider how 
the institutional legacy of previous decades has shaped subsequent fertility trends and 
perhaps moderated the impact of new policy initiatives that, since the turn of the century, 
represent deviations from type. The discussion has a wider relevance, because it raises a 
number of theoretical and practical issues that are pertinent to the way we design cross-
national studies and make use of the evidence. 
 
Theoretical developments in the study of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990) and, more 
recently, in comparative capitalisms (Hall and Soskice 2001) represented a significant 
departure from earlier work which either conceptualized national variations as different 
stages of the same developmental trajectory or presumed institutional variations would 
                                                 
31
 Decommodification is a concept used to guide the comparative analysis of advanced welfare states.  
Esping-Andersen (1990) defines decommodification as “the degree to which individuals, or families, 
can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of labour market participation”. (37)   
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cease to matter as national states converged towards the same equilibrium model.   These 
contributions stressed the importance of path dependencies and institutional 
complementarities which meant that a variety of distinct and stable institutional models 
was not just possible but likely.   Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the UK provided a 
stable and coherent institutional setting which supported a distinct  profile of moderately 
high fertility without making much effort to address issues of work-family reconciliation. 
Appealing to the UK case, and applying the logic of proof by counterexample32, we might be 
tempted to conclude that the hypothesized relationship between family friendly policies 
and fertility can be rejected when ,in fact, such policies may well have been effective where 
they developed as part of a coherent model. 
 
For similar reasons, variations in ideological and institutional legacies can complicate efforts 
to identify and share "best practice”.  The impact of a single policy intervention or policy 
reform (as when Germany adopted radical changes to its parental leave system) can be 
amplified or muted depending on the extent to which it resonates and interacts with the 
wider context.    This consideration becomes increasing relevant in the UK in the past 
decade or so.  Since the late 1990s, the UK has begun to develop a package of work-family 
reconciliation policies, sometimes in (a minimalist) response to EU Directives that were 
developed according to what was seen as best practice in other (usually Scandinavian) 
policy settings.  Taken at face value, these innovations should have reduced the costs of 
childbearing and childrearing.  However, they were inserted into a social and institutional 
setting that remained largely unmodified.  When policies are introduced that deviate from 
previous paths, policy logics and approaches, the wider context may constrain and shape 
their impact in potentially complex and unintended ways (Tunberger and Sigle-Rushton 
2013). Empirical analyses that do not take these complexities into account may under-
estimate the role and importance of the institutions and policies. 
  
                                                 
32
 A proof structure that allows us to conclude that a property is not true by identifying an example 
where it does not hold. 
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Figure 1: The UK Total Fertility Rate 1960-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Inflation Adjusted House Price Index for the UK, 1975-2014 
(Q1 1985 = 100) 
 
 
Source: Nationwide Building Society 
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Figure 3: First Time Buyers’ Gross House Price to Earnings Ratio,  
for the UK and Select Regions, 1983-2014 
 
 
 
Source: Nationwide Building Society 
 
 
Figure 4: Age-specific fertility rates (births per 1000 women),  
England and Wales, 1991-2011 
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